The struggle between ourselves and the Dalai Clique is neither a matter of religious belief, nor a matter of the question of autonomy, it is a matter of securing the unity of our country and opposing splittism...No one should be careless about it. This is a life-and-death struggle, and of course it is not an ordinary issue but an important issue. The Standing Committee of the TAR Congress and the judicial organs should carry out thorough investigations in order to find out problems in the ways we deal with our struggle against splittism, and seriously analyze those problems in the law. If there is anything not yet mentioned in the law, the judicial administrations should give their views quickly and establish laws and regulations to fight against the splittists so that the laws and regulations become more effective ... As "striking relentless blows" is one of the important elements of the Comprehensive Management of Public Security, the judicial organs should organize local public security organizations to solve their own main problems by having focal places to deal with and focal points to solve. We must rely both on the relevant public security offices and on the vast numbers of masses in dealing with public security work.

Third Work Forum on Tibet, Beijing, 1994

This chilling directive was followed immediately by a dramatic escalation of repression throughout Tibet. New security measures were put in place to tighten control over the population. The neighbourhood surveillance system devised during the Cultural Revolution era was resuscitated with networks of informers in offices, work groups, schools, monasteries, apartment buildings and neighbourhoods. In urban public places surveillance cameras were installed and are still widely used. Many Tibetans are coerced into providing information about colleagues and neighbours on pain of losing housing, employment, education, a place in a monastery, etc.

Intimidation of political suspects

In 1995 the authorities introduced a new strategy for intimidating political suspects. Used mostly in urban areas, this strategy involves detaining suspects repeatedly for short periods, often for about two days each week, during which time they are interrogated through the use of sophisticated torture techniques which leave no visible marks. Such techniques include exposure to extreme temperatures or making detainees stand in icy water in winter or sit in crippling positions for long periods.

This technique is typically used against people suspected of communicating information on the situation inside Tibet to the outside world. When the victims are released, they are sufficiently intimidated not to dare tell anyone about their detention lest they suffer another round of torture. In some cases the victims are so intimidated that they agree to become informers for the authorities.

Stepping up repression

In 1996, China's three major political campaigns of "Patriotic Education", "Spiritual Civilization" and "Strike Hard" adopted the Third Forum's objectives and stepped up repression even further. As with "Patriotic Education" and "Spiritual Civilization", the goal of the "Strike Hard" campaign in Tibet, as already stated, differs completely from that in China.

In China, the campaign was launched to combat official corruption and common crimes, such as murder, robbery, drug trafficking, etc. However, in Tibet, it became the cutting edge of China's "relentless blows" at separatism and the influence of the "Dalai Clique".

Addressing the inaugural rally of the "Strike Hard Struggle" on May 6, 1996, Raidi, Executive Deputy Secretary of the "TAR" Communist Party, linked the campaign to the anti-splittist fight when he said, "Tibet is located on the frontline of the anti-separation struggle, and safeguarding social stability and the Motherland's unity is the most important political responsibility." He further stated that "paying great attention to this struggle to severely crack down on crimes is both an expression of whether or not we have a sense of the masses of people, and an expression of whether or not we attach importance to politics."(1)

To drive home the seriousness of this campaign, Tibet Daily on June 17, 1996 carried an article under the name of Bai Zhao, President of the "TAR" Regional People's Court, which urged upgrading of the intensity of the "Strike Hard" struggle and said that severe punishments and death sentences must be meted out to those who deserve them.

Trapping rural 'splittists'

The fact that Beijing perceives the expression of Tibetan culture and identity as a threat to the "Motherland's unity" has widened the scope under which a Tibetan can be charged with "splittist activity".

The charge of "splittism" is no longer restricted to pro-independence demonstrations or distributing leaflets or sharing information with foreign tourists. The new definition of Tibetan nationalism or "splittist activities" extends to even the most minor expressions of Tibet's distinct characteristics. For instance, three Tibetans were arrested in Dram, the last Tibetan outpost on the border with Nepal, in 1999 for performing the religious ceremony of offering incense to the deities to mark the birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on July 6.

Furthermore, with the "Strike Hard" campaign, the authorities has tightened political stranglehold even over the rural masses of Tibet. Commenting on the need for this, Raidi said on January 1, 1998, "The agricultural and pastoral areas have gradually become the frontline in the struggle against separatism... after encountering repeated defeats, the Dalai Clique has in recent years changed the tactics of its scheme by shifting the focus of separatist activities to the vast agricultural and pastoral areas". (2)

In order to consolidate the party's control over rural areas, the authorities in 1998 started installing loyal cadres in key political positions. Raidi, in his public address on November 15, 1998, stated that, "Rural grassroots officials are the key force for uniting and leading the masses in an in-depth struggle against separatism, stabilizing the farming and pastoral areas." The Tibetan edition of the People's Daily reported on July 15, 1998 that the "TAR" had "rectified 650 township and town party committees and 3,602 village party branches" since 1995.

Striking down hard in court

The intensity of the "Strike Hard" campaign can be gauged from the 1996 report presented by Bai Zhao, President of the "TAR" Regional People's Court, at the fifth session of the Sixth "TAR" People's Congress on May 20, 1997.

The report stated that the "TAR" Higher People's Court had "resolutely implemented" the decisions of the Party Central Committee and the Regional Party Committee and launched "coordinated actions in a unified way" to execute the "Strike Hard struggle" with the "power of a thunderbolt" and the "speed of lightning".

The report boasted that in 1996 the court had handled a total of 2,126 criminal cases and that 1,726 detainees involved in 977 cases had been swiftly convicted at their first trial. The report further stated that among the prisoners, 60.8 per cent (1,049) had been sentenced to more than five years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment, or death (a death sentence with reprieve); 37.34 per cent (645) to less than five years of imprisonment; 1.36 per cent (24) had been exempted from punishment; and 0.43 per cent (eight) had been declared not guilty.

Another court report submitted in May 1998 by Bai Zhao said that the courts had tried 6,291 people in the past five years and had found 0.73 percent not guilty. The report further stated that more than half the convicts had been given sentences ranging from five years to death.

Repression breeds resistance

Such repressive measures, while creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, have also bred widespread resentment, sparking off protest demonstrations in more and more areas of Tibet.

According to a report published by the London-based Tibet Information Network, before 1993 political protests tended to be confined to 22 counties inside the "TAR" and nine counties outside the "TAR". However, since 1993 political protests have been reported from 31 counties in the "TAR" and 21 counties in other Tibetan areas.(3) This is an increase of 40 per cent in the "TAR", and 130 per cent in the Tibetan areas outside the "TAR". Similarly, detention cases have also increased by 15 per cent from 500 to 600 in Lhasa city and by 250 per cent from 100 to 350 in other "TAR" areas.

Although we have not been able to obtain adequate information on detention cases in the Tibetan areas outside the "TAR", the figures obtained from the "TAR" may be assumed to be fairly representative of the situation throughout Tibet.

To cope with the increase in arrests of Tibetan political suspects, the Chinese authorities have expanded the network of prison complexes in Tibet. In 1997 a new high security detention and interrogation facility was built in the northeastern suburbs of Lhasa. According to TIN, this facility will house people who are strongly suspected of political disloyalty and former leaders who are said to have made serious mistakes, particularly concerning political matters. In addition, Drapchi and Sangyip prison complexes were expanded in 1998.

The current Chinese hardline policies have only added resolve to the spirit of resistance - even in Tibet's prisons - affecting both political and non-political prisoners. Monks and nuns, who form the bulk of political prisoners, know only too well that at the end of their prison sentence they will find the doors of their monasteries and nunneries firmly shut against their re-entry. They share the lay political prisoners' knowledge that their record of political activism will disqualify them from getting jobs and that they will be under the constant surveillance of police and informers. For all practical purposes, their careers are finished. Furthermore, they are constantly reminded of the increasing threat to the survival of Tibetan culture, religion and identity. This induces a sense of despair in them, driving them to take greater risks to resist their nemesis.

The law vs. realpolitik

In 1990, the then President of the Higher People's Court, said, "Leadership of the Party (CCP) over the courts is the basic guarantee for the courts to achieve their adjudicatory tasks."(4) All acts and beliefs contrary to China's Central Communist Party policy are grounds for suppression, regardless of established legal safeguards.

Although China's constitution and laws provide protection to fundamental rights, these protections are often ignored in practice. It is thus not surprising that Bai Zhao is able to boast such high rates of conviction during the period when the party is in the throes of a campaign to root out Tibetan nationalistic elements.

In 1997 Beijing introduced some changes to the Criminal Procedure Law in order to make it more palatable to the international community. The amended law did away with the term "counter-revolutionary crime" and replaced it with new terminologies such as "crime against state security", "subversion" or "attempts to overthrow the state".

Although the change in terminology has put China in a better position to respond to international criticism against human rights abuses, it has done nothing to make the lives of people any safer. Instead, the new Article 103, dealing with the crime of organizing, plotting or acting to split the country, has had adverse impacts on the security of Tibetans. Articles 102 to 106 of the amended law increase the scope of punitive measures for Tibetans accused of "splittist activities".

Tibet Information Network has noted that, "despite the obsolescence of the criminal terminology of "counter-revolution", sentences for the same activities in Tibet are, on the whole, growing longer, more common, and are being handed down by judicial rather than administrative procedures.(5)

The amended law has limited the judicial detention without charge to a period of maximum of 44 days. However, Part II of this law allows new possibilities for the extension of the period of detention during investigation. Further window dressing was given to the amendment by the elimination of six forms of pre-trial detention, including "shelter and investigation", an administrative form of detention under which a suspect could be held without formal charges for a period of up to three months. But testimonies of lengthy administrative detentions continue to pour out of Tibet.

The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights noted that, "The core deficiency in the Chinese system is the enormous power that the police have to detain suspected criminals."(6)

The changing face of torture

The use of torture is commonplace in Tibet's prisons and detention centres. Torture and other forms of ill-treatment occur throughout the incarceration process: upon arrest, during transportation to detention facilities, in detention centres and in prisons. In 1998, Amnesty International expressed concerns that torture and ill-treatment of detainees in prisons and labour camps remained widespread, sometimes resulting in death.(7) According to Physicians for Human Rights, the frequency of torture - including psychological abuse, beatings, rape, use of electric cattle prods, and prolonged periods of starvation - suggest that torture is part of a widespread pattern of abuse.(8)

Another form of ill-treatment is the denial of adequate medical care to the detainees and prisoners. The US Department of State, in its 1998 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China, stated that the lack of "adequate, timely medical care for prisoners continues to be a serious problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt medical treatment if they become ill".

Article 247 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates that "judicial workers who extort a confession from criminal suspects or defendants by torture or who use force to extract testimony from witnesses, are to be sentenced to three years or fewer in prison or put under criminal detention".(9)

However, such provisions are routinely ignored in the face of political considerations. The aim of torture is to extract "confessions" and names of "accomplices", "organizations", or "foreign associates". The International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims observed that despite the imposition of laws barring torture by prison personnel, as enshrined in Article 14 of the 1994 Chinese Prison Regulations, abuses such as extortion of confessions through torture, inflicting corporal punishment or maltreating prisoners, subjecting prisoners to indignity and beating up prisoners or failing to take action when other people beat up prisoners continue.(10)

Torture is used also to break the spirit of defiance and put prisoners under permanent servitude to the communist party. Small wonder then that almost all the torture victims are those who, during their confinement, had engaged in resistance activities, such as reciting Buddhist mantras, protesting the ill-treatment of inmates, showing allegiance to the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and expressing dissenting views against "political re-education".

In May 1998 at least 10 prisoners in Drapchi Prison, Lhasa, were tortured to death for shouting slogans, such as "Long Live the Dalai Lama" and "Free Tibet", during the visit of an EU delegation composed of Beijing-based ambassadors of Britain, Austria and Luxemburg. Karma Dawa, the leader of the protestors, was executed while the remaining protesting prisoners had their sentences increased by four to five years.

Over the years, torture techniques have become more and more imaginative. The Dharamsala-based Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy has documented a variety of torture techniques or methods that are used against Tibetan detainees and prisoners. These include aerial suspension, hand and foot cuffs, electric shocks, exposure to extreme temperatures, attack by dogs, sexual assault, electric cattle prods applied to sensitive parts of the body, including the genitals and mouths, long period of solitary confinement, urinating in the victim's mouth, forcing victims to watch torture videos, keeping victims standing for long periods of time and deprivation of food, water and sleep.

One notable result of international pressure on China has been a decrease in the execution rate of Tibetan political prisoners over the past few years. Instead of political prisoners, common criminals are executed during times of political tension in Tibet. This serves the purpose of implanting fear in the minds of potential political activists while at the same time posing no great risk of international condemnation. As for political prisoners, execution seems to have been replaced by the use of prolonged torture, leading to quiet death or permanent physical debilitation. The Tibetan Center for Human Rights has recorded 69 deaths since 1987, which have occurred in prisons or immediately after release from prison, either in hospitals or at the victim's residence. All these deaths were attributed to torture in prison.

Tapestry of propaganda

Characteristically, such escalations of repression has not deterred Beijing from publishing White Papers claiming religious freedom and adherence to human rights in Tibet. Obviously, the Chinese authorities believe that they can gloss over their abuses by stepping up propaganda exercises.

The increasing acceptance of China into the world economic mainstream has, no doubt, made the Chinese Government more sensitive to international public opinion. Unfortunately, this sensitivity has not translated into more benign rule over Tibetans. Instead, it has resulted in the development of subtler mechanisms of repression and a mammoth increase in resources for international public relations exercises.

One of the recommendations of the Third Forum was to invite friendly foreign journalists to Tibet and get them to lend their voices to the chorus of Chinese official propaganda. And, indeed, in recent years a number of "friendly foreign journalists" have visited Tibet, where they were carefully guided to interviews with Tibetan officials and puppets bound by golden threads to the country's new masters. Ordinary Tibetans are not allowed to speak even to tourists, let alone journalists. Similarly, journalists deemed to be sympathetic to the plight of Tibetans can never expect to be allowed officially into Tibet.

The Chinese leadership knows only too well that as long as the lions do not have their own historians, the stories of the jungle will be only about the bravery of hunters.

NOTES:

1. Xizang Ribao (Tibet Daily), May 11, 1996, SWB May 20, 1996
2. Public speech on January 1, 1998, as quoted in Tibet Information Network News Review 27, 1999, London
3. Marshall, Steve D., Hostile Elements: A Study of Political Imprisonment in Tibet: 1987-1998, Tibet Information Network, 1999 p6
4. TCHRD's Tightening of Control , 1999, p17
5. Marshall, Steve D., Hostile Elements: A Study of Political Imprisonment in Tibet: 1987-1998 Tibet Information Network, 1999 p6
6. Lawyers Committe for Human Rights, Opening to Reforms? An Analysis of China's Revised Criminal Procedure Law, 1996
7. Amnesty International Report, 1998, p132
8. Physicians for Human Rights, Striking Hard: Torture in Tibet, IRCT, Vol. 9, No. 1a, June 1999, p 45
9. Adopted by the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979 and amended by the fifth session of the Eighth National People's Congress on March 14, 1997
10. International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, Torture in Tibet: 1949-1999, Vol. 9, Number 1a, 1999, p18
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