One area where the Tibet issue has seriously damaged the image of China is in external publicity. In terms of international media coverage Dharamsala has made significant advances with Beijing fighting a rear-guard campaign.

This vulnerability has been noted by the Chinese authorities. In 1993, on the anniversary of the March 10 Uprising, "Old Tibet Hands" and experts met in Beijing to rectify the situation by devising a propaganda offensive on the issue of Tibet in an attempt to regain lost ground.

The meeting was attended by Zeng Jian-hui, Vice-Minister of the Propaganda Ministry, who articulated significant guidelines. The recommendations the group made had a critical impact on the formulation of the decisions made at the Third Work Forum on Tibet held the following year in Beijing.

The foremost concern of the group who met in 1993 was the realization that China was losing the propaganda war over the situation in Tibet. The dilemma which confronted Chinese officials was the western media's consistently positive - and often outraged - coverage of the Tibetan tragedy. The Beijing authorities noted that the Western media's repeated depiction of China as the big, bad bully in regard to Tibet undermined China's image and proved a major irritant in China's global diplomatic dealings.

The mandate of the group was to reverse this damaging trend by coming up with new and fresh ideas which would be translated into concrete and supposedly imaginative policy guidelines.

A history of war of words

A brief survey of the history of the war of words between the Tibetan movement and Beijing reveals the ground lost by the Chinese and gained by exile Tibetans. This is illustrated by the apocryphal conversation that Mao Zedong had with Nikita Khrushchev when the Chinese leader briefed his Soviet counterpart on China's successful crackdown on the 1959 Tibetan Uprising and the mopping-up that followed. After Mao's glowing briefing, couched in communist rhetoric, about dealing a blow for the socialist world, Khrushchev asked Mao, "And what happened to the Dalai Lama?"

"He escaped," Mao replied smugly, with an air that said good riddance.

"Then you lost the war," said Khrushchev.

This conversational fragment comes down to us as an insight into the myths and legends that surround the Cold War era; most importantly it illustrates the extent to which the Tibetan refugees were able to make their voices heard in the world within a matter of several decades and change international public opinion in their favour on the vexed question of Tibet.

Earlier, when the PLA invaded the plateau in 1949, China was considered the new beacon of the socialist world - especially for countries which suffered western colonial domination. Because of Tibet's isolation, and its absence from influential global fora, international media coverage of the invasion became almost an afterthought and was ill-informed.

At the same time Communist China's propaganda machinery worked overtime to successfully put a spin on the event, depicting the invasion as a "liberation" of long-suffering "serfs" and "slaves". China was also, to some extent, successful in portraying those who opposed the invasion as "running dogs of the capitalists" bent on wrecking the socialist camp. Tibet was projected as a Cold War issue which succeeded in silencing the socialist camp.

At the same time China could tell the world what it wanted the world to believe about Tibet, without any effective Tibetan response.

Beijing was largely helped in its monopoly of positive international news coverage of its rule in Tibet by leftist intellectuals and writers who sang praises of the new socialist Tibet. The avalanche of books by fellow-travellers was started by Roma and Stuart Gelder with their Timely Rain which put a positive spin on Chinese rule in Tibet and ended with Han Suyin's Lhasa: the Open City which painted a glowing picture of a progressive socialist Tibet.

In all this journalistic hype, the destruction which was inflicted across the plateau during Mao's "democratic reforms", the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution went unreported and was therefore a historic blank for the outside world. Autobiographical statements made by exile Tibetans describing the atrocities that were rife in Tibet were dismissed as "refugee statements" with the implication that refugees would naturally have a vested interest in saying bad things about China to justify their exile existence.

China's success over Tibet-both on the ground and over the airwaves-was complete. The invasion of Tibet was largely forgotten by the international community and the Chinese occupation of the roof of the world was hailed as a victory for the "liberated" toiling masses. In short, the international community considered the issue of Tibet a non-issue. In this vein some commentators described the Tibetan exiles' efforts to keep the issue alive as "beating a dead yak to life".

But then international media coverage slowly reversed itself as Tibet became more known. Several factors were responsible. One was the frequent world tours of His Holiness the Dalai Lama since 1979. He was able to tell the Tibetan side of the story with great persuasiveness. His winning personality and transparent honesty instantly made powerful friends and supporters. The sustained efforts of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and the unwavering courage and determination of the Tibetan people kept the issue alive. The increasing western fascination with Tibetan Buddhism turned individuals' attention to Tibet's political fate - many of whom became vocal Tibet supporters.

China's limited opening up of Tibet to the outside world with liberalization attracted a flood of tourists in the early 1980s. The impact of Tibetan good cheer made an indelible impression on early tourists. They returned to their countries and formed Tibet Support Groups - working doggedly to see that the suffering undergone by Tibetans was accurately reported in the media.

The Tibetan official fact-finding delegations from Dharamsala - which China accepted into Tibet from 1979 to 1985 - brought out evidence on still and movie films of the appalling conditions in Tibet and the depth of loyalty Tibetans still felt for His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

In the midst of this, a book appeared which helped to significantly change international opinion on the issue of Tibet. John Avedon's path-breaking In Exile from the Land of Snows gave to the world the first detailed account of the Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule. It carried graphic accounts of horror stories during the Cultural Revolution and in the prisons and labour camps and of the strength of the Tibetan spirit to endure.

This book, written with elegance and with an insider's knowledge of people and events, triggered the trend of the present growing Western fascination with Tibet. Hollywood noticed this expanding market and decided to join the bandwagon by producing Seven Years in Tibet and Kundun, two films on pre-invasion Tibet which reached out to millions of viewers around the world.

In the late 1980s a monitoring agency was launched in London which disseminated precise news of events unfolding inside Tibet. Tibet Information Network greatly enhanced the outside world's knowledge of political upheavals and sentiments inside Tibet. On top of this, thanks to US Congressional legislation in the early 1990s, a Tibetan language service of Voice of America was able to beam news directly to Tibet. It was later reinforced by the establishment of Radio Free Asia and Voice of Tibet's Tibetan language broadcasts. All three stations address Tibet directly and those living under China today describe their broadcasts as "medicine for a sick person".

Learning from Dharamsala

The purpose of the meeting of China's spin doctors in Beijing on March 10, 1993 was to ponder the factors which enabled the Tibetan leadership and people in exile to take a true great leap forward in stealing international public opinion in their favour under the very nose of China.

The media czar and propaganda chiefs met in Beijing to devise counter- strategies to win public opinion back. With typical Chinese logic they relied on Sun Tzu's classic The Art of War and also on some tricks learned from the Tibetan exiles' media strategy. "Know your enemy" is one of the injunctions of The Art of War.

Beijing was also concerned about the Tibetan exiles' successful efforts in "internationalizing the issue of Tibet". Because of the support drawn to the nonviolent appeal of the Tibetan struggle, the Chinese authorities realized that winning over international public opinion must be a key factor in the success of their own efforts.

"Our struggle against the Dalai Clique and the international enemy force is to a large degree carried out through propaganda and public opinion. External propaganda plays an outstanding and special role... Looking at it in a larger picture, the external propaganda work on the question of Tibet has a bearing not only on the development of Tibet, but also on the image of China as a whole in the world, as well as the creation of a good international environment for reform, open policy and the construction of the modernization of all China."(1)

In reaching their objective, the officials - in a throwback to Cold War rhetoric - identified three areas as China's main problems. The first was the Dalai Clique; the second, hostile western forces and the third, foreign reporters. The officials suspected very strongly that there was a definite collusion between the three forces to destabilize China.

The other policy which was outlined in Beijing was to make a sustained effort to win over Tibetans living abroad and in this way isolate the establishment in Dharamsala headed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The officials also recommended that propaganda work in Tibet amongst the general populace be intensified.

The official identification of His Holiness the Dalai Lama as a problem, and heaping abuse upon him, became a major departure in policy. Even at the height of the demonstrations which rocked Lhasa in the later 1980s, Chinese officials were measured in their criticism of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. This is no longer so. The policy today is to "expose" the Dalai Lama and undermine his credibility not only as a religious leader and spokesperson for the Tibetan people but importantly as a major voice on global affairs which Beijing sees as tarnishing its image.

In this regard Zeng Jian-hui, Vice-Minister of the Propaganda Ministry, said, " Fourthly, the strategy of their struggle continues to be double-faced. On the one hand, he (the Dalai Lama) stops at nothing in labelling himself as "a fighter for international human rights", "fighter for peace" and an "advocate of nonviolent struggle". On the other hand he secretly masterminds turbulence... Our external propaganda work should write articles in this respect to expose him."(2)

World support alarms Beijing

Many recommendations made at the Beijing propaganda meeting were incorporated into decisions of the 1994 Third Forum on Work in Tibet. All the issues which hurt Beijing's image were spelt out in the extensive comments Raidi made on the outcome of the Third Work Forum in Lhasa in 1994:

"By attacking the Dalai Clique we must try to gain support throughout space and in people's hearts... By raising the standard of planning and anticipation, by improving the efficiency of propaganda work abroad, by using well our policies and tactics, and by improving our ability to carry out propaganda work abroad, we must gradually change the international point of view. We must boldly do propaganda work showing that Tibet is a part of China...

"We must reveal the true colours of the Dalai Clique and the dark side of the serf system of old Tibet...The Western countries are supporting and encouraging the Dalai Clique and using the so-called Tibet issue to interfere in our country's internal affairs... By working hard we must defeat their hope of internationalizing the Tibet issue."(3)

"Western enemy forces" covers everything from individual Western supporters to Western parliaments, human rights groups, aid organizations, NGOs and countries which routinely support tabling of human rights resolutions at the annual UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

To counter this Beijing's propaganda team recommended that China's publicity must focus on "overseas people". The 1993 meeting recommended, "Multi-level and different forms of vivid and lively propaganda should be carried out regarding sovereignty and human rights record. Its aim is to promote the further understanding on the part of the overseas people of the question of Tibet so as to eliminate the impact created by the Dalai Clique and the international enemy forces through their distortions and attacks against us... and to win the support and sympathy of the overseas people for us."(4)

To follow up on this recommendation Beijing has hosted a long list of parliamentarians, UN officials, foreign leaders, reporters and businessmen in Tibet. From 1997 to 1999 over 20 foreign delegations visited the plateau.5 Despite the VIP nature of these visits, China was unable to ultimately hide its atrocities. In May 1998, during an EU troika delegation's visit to Lhasa, the inmates of Drapchi Prison staged a protest demonstration to attract the attention of the delegation to the worsening plight of the Tibetan people. The guards reacted to this by torturing ten prisoners to death and executing the leader.

In changing the opinion of influential people on the situation in Tibet, China is successful to an extent. For example, in September 1999 the Australian National Party member of parliament, Garry Nehl, visited Tibet and told the Australian media, "I did not see any road blocks, checkpoints or any other signs of restrictions on freedom of movement. Equally, there were no restrictions on people entering monasteries or temples and throughout Lhasa there were a great many people perambulating themselves with prayer wheels and freely prostrating themselves on the ground in prayer."(6)

However, China has focussed its greatest efforts on foreign correspondents in an attempt to make them reiterate the Chinese side of the Tibet story. Official Chinese documents are unusually frank on this issue.

"We should reinforce the work of utilizing the power of foreign propaganda...Therefore, we should be more open-minded in our external propaganda work on Tibet. By arranging foreign journalists and other people to go to visit Tibet we should be able to use foreign forces to carry out our external propaganda and gradually change their minds about us through what they have seen with their own eyes."(7)

Furthermore, in July 2000 China invited N. Ram, the editor of Frontline, a weekly published from the south Indian city of Chennai, for a week-long visit to Tibet. His regurgitation of Chinese communist propaganda was splashed over 36 pages of the September 15 edition. Unusually for a professional journalist, N. Ram makes his bias clear right from the first sentence. He describes himself as an "Indian ... who has no sympathy for the Dalai Lama's separatist, revanchist and backward-looking agenda."(8)

On September 7, 2000 the Taipei-based New China News Agency reported that a 17-member delegation comprising representatives of major Taiwan media left Taipei that day for a "news coverage mission" to Tibet. They were joined in Chengdu, capital of Sichuan province by Mainland Chinese media representatives. The news report said a total of 40 reporters from television companies, news agencies, newspapers and radio stations on both sides of the Taiwan Straits left for Tibet the next day on a 10-day visit.

The report stated that this was the first time that Taiwanese journalists have been allowed to provide coverage from Tibet. The NCNA further stated: "Mainland sources said the visit is a part of Beijing's drive to publicize Tibet's cultural, economic and human rights development over the past half-century under communist Chinese rule."

In Lhasa the Taiwanese and Mainland journalists met with Raidi, who is increasingly prominent as the "TAR" spokesperson. Raidi delivered the standard line and said, "We firmly oppose any people, any group and any nation to interfere in China's internal affairs by using the Dalai Clique and the so-called Tibet issue."(9)

This imaginative initiative to venture into new - and what is still enemy territory - was decided by the 1993 Beijing meeting. The high-level resulting document called "Guidelines and Content of the External Propaganda Work on the Question of Tibet" said, "This year, on the premise of thoughtful planning and careful arrangement, we shall choose the right time to properly arrange for foreign journalists and those from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan to visit Tibet."(10)

China now aims to dominate the world news industry. On September 8, 2000 the Beijing bureau of AFP, the French news agency, reported that China would start beaming round-the-clock television news in English. The 24-hour English language satellite news broadcasts will cover 98 per cent of the world. CCTV 9 will go on air on the eve of the anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 2000. This global TV channel aims to dwarf existing news channels like BBC and CNN.

Behind this savvy media strategy is Zhao Qizheng - a nuclear physicist brought to Beijing from Shanghai in 1998 to head the Information Office of the State Council, who thus in effect became China's foremost spin doctor.(11) Zhao Qizheng doubled the frequency of media briefings and urged officials to be more accommodating to journalists. He is behind the new and refurbished charm offensive of Jiang Zemin, China's President. During Jiang's recent visit to New York to attend the millennium UN summit of world leaders, Zhao ventured into the lion's den and addressed more than 100 reporters at the National Press Club, where he wondered aloud, "Why is the mainstream US media against China? Why should the US keep interfering in issues concerning China's Taiwan, Tibet and religion?"(12)

However, despite the efforts of Zhao Qizheng - who has the backing of Washington's powerful China lobby, the prestigious PR firm, Hill and Knowlton, and Henry Kissinger it will take years for Beijing to enjoy good coverage on the issue of Tibet as long as China remains a one-party totalitarian system.

Rather than relying on media strategies, China will need to significantly improve the lot of the Tibetan people before its tarnished image is restored to greatness the Chinese people deserve.

NOTES:

1. Excerpted from a statement by Tenzin, Deputy Secretary of "TAR" and published in "China's Public Relations Strategy on Tibet". Classified Documents from the Beijing Propaganda Conference, published by International Campaign for Tibet, Washington, D.C., 1993
2. Excerpted from a guideline outlined by Zeng Jian-hui, Vice-Minister of Beijing's Propaganda Ministery, published ibid.
3. Excerpted from comments made by Raidi, Deputy Secretary of "TAR" at the annual meeting of the "TAR" Communist Party Committee meeting in Lhasa, September 5,1994. These documents are now published as Cutting Off the Serpent's Head -Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995, by the London-based Tibet Information Network and Human Rights Watch/Asia, New York, 1996
4. "China's Public Relations Strategy on Tibet" - Classified Documents from the Beijing Propaganda Conference, published by ICT, Washington, DC, 1994.
5. "Tibetan Stake in China-West Relations", an article by Kalon Tempa Tsering. Tibetan Bulletin, November-December, 1999
6. "Australian Parliamentarians in Tibet: the Credibility Gap" in Australia Tibet Council News, October 1999
7. China's Public Relations Strategy on Tibet: Classified Documents from the Beijing Propaganda Conference, published by ICT, D.C., 1993
8. Frontline, September 15, 2000
9. As quoted in People's Daily, Beijing official organ, September 14, 2000
10. China's Public Relations Strategy on Tibet, ICT. 1994
11. Asiaweek, September 22, 2000
12. ibid

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Last updated: 19-September-2000